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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
WAS IT ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS TO RECEIVE
INTO EVIDENCE THE INTOXILYZER TEST RESULT
WHEN ONLY ONE SECTION 41-6-44.3 AFFIDAVIT
WAS INTRODUCED?
WAS THE INTOXILYZER AFFIDAVIT IMPROPERLY
RECEIVED BECAUSE IT WAS NOT ACCOMPANIED
BY A CUSTODIAN'S CERTIFICATE?
WAS IT ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS FOR THE
HEARING OFFICER TO RECEIVE INTO EVIDENCE
THE INTOXILYZER TEST RESULT WHEN HE
FAILED TO MAKE FINDINGS IN COMPLIANCE
WITH UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION
41-6-44.3(1) AND (2)?
WAS APPELLANT'S ARREST UNLAWFUL BECAUSE
IT WAS UNSUPPORTED BY REASONABLE GROUNDS?
DO UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTIONS 41-2-19.6
AND 41-2-20 DENY UTAH DRIVERS PROCEDURAL
DUE PROCESS BECAUSE THEY FAJLTO PROVIDE
MINIMUM SAFEGUARDS AGAINST ^N ERRONEOUS
DEPRIVATION OF A LICENSE?
WAS THE APPELLANT DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW
BECAUSE THE SAME EMPLOYEE OF RESPONDENT
ACTED BOTH AS PROSECUTOR AND JUDGE?
DO UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 41-2-19.6
AND 41-2-20 DENY UTAH DRIVERS WHO SUBMIT
TO CHEMICAL TESTS EQUAL PROJECTION OF
THE LAW?

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The appellant contends that the intoxilyzer test result
was improperly received into evidence since only one § 41-6-44.3
affidavit was introduced.

Appellant submits that logic and

§ 41-6-44.3 require that two affidavits, one prior to and one
after the intoxilyzer test was administered, must be introduced
before a test result can be received.

Appellant also submits

that the affidavit was improperly received because it was not
accompanied by a custodian's certificate. In the absence of such
a document, the affidavit does not satisfy the requirements set
forth by § 41-6-44.3 or Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314 (Ut.
1983).

Appellant also argues that the test result was improperly

received since no findings were made that the challenged affidavit was generated under circumstances indicating trustworthiness.
Similarly, no findings were made that the machine complied with
standards prom-ulgated by the commissioner of public safety.
Appellant also submits that viewing all the evidence, her arrest
was not supported by probable cause.

Appellant also submits that

the hearing she received failed to afford her due process of law.
Not enough safeguards against error were incorporated into the
hearing.

Additionally, the hearing officer was not impartial.

Because the hearing officer acted as both prosecutor and judge,
no independent judicial determination was made.

Finally,

appellant submits that she was denied equal protection of the
law.

Although she agreed to submit to a chemical test, she

received far less due process than the uncooperative driver who
refuses to submit to such a test.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

VICKI MOON,
Appellant,
BRIEfF OF APPELLANT
-vFRED C. SCHWENDIMAN, in his
official capacity as Director
of the Office of Driver
License Services of the
State of Utah, and the OFFICE
OF DRIVER LICENSE SERVICES
of the State of Utah,

Cas^ No.

20323

Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment suspending appellant's
driving privileges for ninety days in th[e Third District Court in
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Dean E.
Conder, presiding.
In a review authorized by U.C.A|. § 41-2-20, the
Honorable Dean E. Conder of the Third Judicial District Court
found that the suspension of appellant's| driving privileges was
not arbitrary or capricious.

STATEMENT OF FACJTS
On July 29, 1984, Utah Highway patrol Trooper K. Craig
Allred observed the appellant driving wejstbound on Interstate 80
- 1 -

Appellant's vehicle was observed making an abrupt lane change as
it entered the freeway.

The Trooper estimated the appellant acce-

lerated to 80 miles per hour.

The Trooper initiated a traffic

stop of the appellant (Transcript of Hearing, 4 ) . The Trooper
detected an odor of alcohol and requested the appellant to submit
to field agility tests (T.5).
The first test was the alphabet test.

On her first

attempt, appellant became nervous, and asked if she could perform
the test a second time (T.21).

On her second attempt, the

Trooper testified she recited correctly until the letter "U".

At

that point the Trooper stated the appellant said, "U, N, V, W,
X, Y, Z," (T.5).

The appellant explained that her use of "N" in

between the letters "U" and "V" was a Utah colloquialism for the
article of speech, "and" (T.21).

Appellant denied that she had

confused the letters.
The second test was the finger count.

Appellant per-

formed this test correctly two out of three times (T.16).

The

next test was a balance test where the subject tilts her head
back and closes her eyes.
bit (T.18).

The Trooper conceded that everyone who performs that

test moves a little (T.18).
test.

The Trooper observed her move a little

The next test was the finger to nose

The appellant touched the tip of her nose with the first

digit of her index finger on her first attempt.
from the direction to touch tip to tip (T.18).

This deviated
On her second

attempt, appellant touched tip to tip with her thumb.
On the heel-to-toe test, the appellant took the correct
number of steps in each direction, turned correctly, but left
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several inches between her heel and her toe on a few steps
(T.19).

The last test was the key drop.

The object of this test

is for the subject to move her foot aft^r the officer drops the
keys, but before the keys hit the subject's foot.

One out of

three times the appellant moved her foot so the keys did not
stike it (T. 6).
Appellant did not slur her speech throughout her contact
with Trooper Allred (T.13).
and over-anxious (T.13).

She was cooperative, but nervous

During the performance of the tests,

appellant told the Trooper that she had sore feet from hiking all
day (T.14).
At the conclusion of the tests, the appellant was
arrested for driving under the influence.

An intoxilyzer test

was administered with a .10 result (T.9)|.
Appellant received a "per se" hearing before respondent.
The hearing was conducted by Dennis Hicks, an employee of respondent (T. 1). One affidavit dated July 25, 1984 was introduced at
the hearing to establish the trustworthiness of the machine used
to test the appellant's blood alcohol content. (Appendix 1).
Appellant's driver's license was suspended for ninety days after
the hearing pursuant to U.C.A. §41-2-19.fe.
On appeal to the district court, the matter was submitted to the court after legal arguments and memoranda were
submitted.

No additional evidence was offered by either party to

supplement the record.

Respondent's suspension of appellant's

driver's license was affirmed by the district court. The
appellant's request to have her license teinstated pending the
outcome of her appeal in this Court was denied.

- 3 -

ARGUMENT
POINT I
IT WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS TO
RECEIVE INTO EVIDENCE THE INTOXILYZER
TEST RESULT WHEN ONLY ONE § 41-6-44.3
AFFIDAVIT WAS INTRODUCED
At the appellant's administrative per se hearing, only
one affidavit (Appendix 1) was introduced which purported to
attest to the accuracy and trustworthiness of the intoxilyzer
test result in the case at bar.
1984.

That affidavit is dated July 25,

No other affidavit was introduced attesting to the

accuracy and proper functioning of the machine at any time after
the appellant's arrest date.
It is the appellant's position that in the absence of
some evidence of the accuracy and proper functioning of the
intoxilyzer machine after appellant's arrest, no proper foundation was laid for the receipt into evidence of the intoxilyzer
test result.

It is elementary that the proponent of the intoxi-

lyzer must show that the machine was functioning properly before
test results can be received.

Although an intoxilyzer may be

operating properly on a given datef it does not necessarily
follow that the machine is still operating accurately four days
later.

Both the case law and standards promulgated by the

Commissioner of Public Safety pursuant to U.C.A. § 41-6-44.3
recognize this logic.
U.C.A. § 41-6-44.3 (Appendix 2) set forth the foundational requirements for affidavits to be introduced in lieu of
an officer's testimony regarding the maintenance and proper
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functioning of a breath testing instrument.

The statute incor-

porates into its foundational requirements the Commissioner's
Breath Testing Regulations (Appendix 3). Regulation III(A),
Tests for Checking Calibration, providesz "Breath testing instruments must be certified on a routine basis not to exceed forty
(40) days."
The logic behind this requirement must certainly be that
if a machine was functioning before and after a particular test
was administered, then an inference can be drawn that the machine
functioned properly on the date of the subject test if the operator followed the steps properly.

In the absence of such testi-

mony which "bookends" the subject test, a finder of fact is left
to speculate and conjecture whether the machine functioned properly on the subject date.

Regardless of whether the breath test

is utilized in a criminal or civil setting, this minimum foundational requirement inheres.

POINT II
THE INTOXILYZER AFFIDAVIT WAS IMPROPERLY
RECEIVED BECAUSE IT WAS NOT ACCOMPANIED
BY A CUSTODIAN'S CERTIFICATE
The challenged July 25th affidavit (Appendix 1) was
introduced into evidence at the administrative per se hearing by
the Hearing Officer.

No explanation is offered on the face of

the docuemnt which explains where it came from, who maintained
it, whether it was maintained in the regular course of anyone's
official duties, or even how it appeared in the Hearing Officer's
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possession.

It was not included in the peicket of documents

mailed to the Department of Public Safety by the arresting
officer.

It was not accompanied by a "Custodian's Certificate."

Although Troopers Nielsen and Kooring have signed the document
underneath the words "Breath Test Technician(s)", there is
nothing on the face of the affidavit to attest to the authenticity
of any such training or expertise.

Furthermore, although the

affidavits states that the test of the machine was done according
to standards established by the Commissioner of the Department of
Public Safety, there is nothing on the face of the document to
verify the assertions of Troopers Kooring and Nielsen.
Appellant submits that a Custodian's Certificate
(Appendix 4) is a necesary predicate for the admissibility of the
July 25th affidavit.

Custodian's Certificate could serve to

explain the source of the July 25th affidavit.
explain where the original document was located.

It could also
But perhaps

most importantly, it could certify the qualifications of the
breath test technicians.

Nothing on the July 25th affidavit

asserts that either Trooper Kooring or Trooper Nielsen have met
any of the requirements for breath test technicians as set forth
in Regulation V of the Breath Testing Regulations. (Appendix 3).
In the absence of such information, the affidavit alone does not
establish that a qualified technician, as mandated by U.C.A. §
41-6-44.3(1), has examined the machine.
Because the affidavit simply appeared at the hearing
below without an accompanying Custodian Certificate, its genesis
is a mystery.

Appellant submits that the "indications of trust-
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worthiness" requirement of~§ 41-6-44.3(2)(b) precludes the
admission of the July 25th affidavit without some additional
foundation.

Again, the Custodian's Certificate would appear to

remedy the defect since such a document could help to support a
finding that the method and circumstances of the affidavit's preparation were such as to indicate its trustworthiness.
§ 41-6-44.3 requires such findings before an affidavit may be
received.

If there was some basis to conclude that the tech-

nician was an expert, as required by statute, then a finding
could be made consistent with the mandate of § 41-6-44.3(2)(a)
and (b) that the testing procedure was trustworthy.

Absent such

information, the July 25th affidavit alone does not satisfy the
minimum foundational requirements imposed by § 41-6-44.3.
In Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314 (Ut. 1983), this
court stated that § 41-6-44.3 was a codification of the business
records exception.

In State v. Bertul, 644 P.2d 1181 (Ut. 1983),

the Supreme Court discussed the foundational requirements for the
business records exception to the hearsay rule.

In Bertful, one

of the requirements set forth for a business record to be
admitted was that "the evidence must support a conclusion that
after recordation the document was kept under circumstances that
would preserve its integrity."

In the instant matter, only spe-

culation can lead to such a conclusion.

For these reasons,

appellant submits that the receipt into evidence of the intoxilyzer test result was arbitrary and capricious.

POINT III
BECAUSE THE HEARING OFFICER FAILED TO
MAKE FINDINGS IN COMPLIANCE WITH SUB- 7 -

SECTIONS (1) AND (2) OF § 41-6-44.3,
THE RECEIPT OF THE INTOXILYZER TEST
RESULT WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS
The administrative hearing officer failed to make any
findings as mandated by subsections (1) and (2) of § 41-6-44.3.
The trial judge also failed to make any such findings.

The trial

judge did, however, refer to "reliability" in Conclusion of Law
#3:
The Court concludes that the intoxilyzer machine was reliable and the
results admissible before the Department pursuant to the presumption
set forth in U.C.A. § 41-6-44.3 and
44.3, a'nd Murray City v. Hall.
This reference does not satisfy the strict requirement
that such findings be made before § 41-6-44.3 affidavits can be
received into evidence.

In Murray City v. Hall, supra, this

court noted that such findings would not be implied.
Accordingly, since no such findings were made, the July 25th affidavit was inadmissible, and its receipt into evidence was
arbitrary and capricious.

POINT IV
APPELLANT'S ARREST WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE GROUNDS
AND WAS THEREFORE UNLAWFUL
The appellant's driving pattern consisted of speeding
and one abrupt lane change.

This driving pattern does not in

itself amount to probable cause to arrest the appelalnt for
driving under the influence.

In addition to the driving pattern,
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the arresting officer also testified that he detected the
odor of alcohol on appellant's breath.

These facts were also

insufficient to rise to the level of probable cause.
The only other evidence to support a finding of probable
cause was the appellant's performance on the field agility tests.
Judging a driver's performance on field agility tests is a subjective task at best.

In the case at bar, the appellant submits

that her performance on the field tests did not give rise to a
finding of probable cause that she was appreciably impaired as a
rsult of the consumption of an alcoholic beverage.

Although the

appellant made some minor errors on the tests, her over-all performance was satisfactory.

Indeed, appellant submits that this

was a case where the arresting officer continued to administer
tests until the appellant finally failed a test.

Viewing all the

evidence, appellant submits that her arijest was not supported by
reasonable grounds to believe she was under the influence.
Because the arrest was unlawful, the suspension of her license
was arbitrary and capricious.

POINT V
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTIONS 41-2-19.6
AND 41-2-20 DENY UTAH DRIVERS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive citizens of "liberty" or "property"
interests within the meaning of the Due process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
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Section 7 of the Utah Constitution.

Board of Regents v. Roth,

408 U.S. 564, 569-571 (1972), Ballard v. State, 595 P.2d 1302
(Utah 1979).

In our mobile society, the retention of a driver's

license is an important right to every person who has obtained
such a license.
Although the United States Supreme Court once recognized
a distinction between "rights" and "privileges" in determining
whether to afford due process protection to asserted property
rights, the Court has now abandoned the artificial distinction
between rights and privileges.

Instead, the Court has expressed

a preference for a flexible definition of property:
"Property" interests subject to procedural
due process protection are not limited by
a few rigid, technical forms,. Rather,
"property" denotes a broad range of interests that are secured by "existing rules
or understandings. "
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
And in Board of Regents v. Roth, supra, 408 U.S. at 577,
the Court observed:
It is a purpose of the ancient institution
of property to protect those claims upon
which people rely in their daily lives,
reliance that must not be arbitrarily
undermined. It is a purpose of the constitutional right to a hearing to provide
an opportunity for a person to vindicate
those claims.
The Utah Supreme Court has also adopted this reasoning
in Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 657
P.2d 1293 (1979).

In that case, the Liquor Commission argued

that a liquor license constituted a privilege revocable at the
pleasure or whim of the Liquor Commission rather than a right
protected by the full panoply of due process guarantees.
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The

Utah Supreme Court eschewed this logic.
Thus, appellant's driver's license is indisputably a
property interest subject to due process protection:
Suspension of issued licenses. . . involved
state action that adjudicates important interests of the licenses. In such cases the
licenses are not to be taken away without
that procedural due process required by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Bell v. Burson,
402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971), and Dixon v. Love,
431 U.S. 105, 112 (1977). Also see Ballard
v. State, 595 P.2d 1302 (^979), which cites
with approval Bell v. Bursjon, supra.
Once due process is implicated by a property interest,
then the issue becomes what kind of notice and hearing are
constitutionally required to permit the deprivation of such an
interest.

The United States Supreme Court has stated that the

quantum and quality of the notice and the hearing vary depending
upon the property interest implicated by the deprivation.

Thus,

the Court noted in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972),
that it was axiomatic that due process "is flexible and calls for
such procedural protections as the particular situation demands."
Because of the severe personal ind economic hardships
which can and do ensue in our travel-oriented society from
suspension of a driver's license, even f0r a 90 day period,
appellant submits that she is constitutionally entitled to a more
meaningful hearing then she received pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated Section 41-2-19.6 and a more meaningful review than
she received under Utah Code Annotated Section 41-2-20.
A.

OVERVIEW OF UTAHfS PER SE REVOCATION STATUTES

After a driver has been arreste4 for driving under the
influence by a police officer who has reasonable grounds to
-11-

believe a violation has occurred, the officer is authorized by
Utah Code Annotated Section 41-2-19.6 to request a chemical test
to determine the driver's blood alochol content.

If the driver

submits to the test and the results indicate a blood alcohol content of .08% or more, then the arresting officer is authorized to
notify the driver of the Driver License Services1 intention to
suspend the driver's license for 90 days.
temporary license valid for 30 days.

The driver is issued a

The driver is notified of

his right to request a hearing regarding the suspension of his
license.

The request must be made in writing within 10 days of

his arrest.
If a hearing is heldf it is held before an officer
employed by the respondenet.

The scope of the hearing is limited

to 1) whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe
the person to have been operating a motor vehicle under the
influence, 2) whether the person submitted to a chemical test,
and 3) if sof the results of the test.
In addition to this administrative review, Utah Code
Annotated Section 41-2-20 authorizes the driver to file a petition for review in the district court in the county in which he
resides.

The statute specifically circumscribes the scope

of the district court's review:
The court's jurisdiction is limited to a
review of the record to determine whether
or not the department's decision was
arbitrary or capricious.
B.

WHAT IS THE CHARACTER OP A SECTION
41-2-19.6 ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING

The resolution of whether the procedures provided under Utah Code
Annotated Section 41-2-19.6 and Section 41-2-20 are constitu- 12 -

tionally permissible requires close scrutiny of the nature of the
administrative hearing.

Utah Code Annotated Section 41-2-19.6

provides that the arresting officer must submit a copy of the
citation issued regarding the offense, as well as a sworn report
indicating the chemical test result, if any, and other bases for
officer's belief that the driver was under the influence.

The

sworn report is also endorsed by the chief of police, or a person
authorized by him.

The endorsement of the arresting officer's

report by the chief of police presumably lends credence or
integrity to the accuracy of that report.

However, the actual

safeguarding benefit of this measure se^ms highly questionable.
C.

MACKEY V. MONtRYM

In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), the
Supreme Court enunciated the factors which a court must balance
when evaluating what process is constitutionally due to protect
against an erroneous deprivation of a pifotectible property
interest:
First, the private interest that will be
affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;
and finally, the Government's interest,
including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that
the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.
The Supreme Court applied these factors to a review of
the Massachusetts implied consent law in Mackey v. Montrym, 443
U.S. 1 (1979).

The license revocation ip Massachusetts occurs
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whenever a driver refuses to submit to a chemical test.

The

revocation is based upon a report from a peace officer filed with
the state licensing agency.

The post-revocation review system

provides multiple levels of review.

The Eirst review is an

appearance before the Registrar of Motor Vehicles.

The second

review is before an administrative body known as the Board of
Appeal.

The final review is a judicial review.
Applying the Mathews v. Eldridge test in Montrym, the

court identified the private interest as the driver's interest in
continued possession and use of his license pending the outcome
of the revocation hearing.

Citing Dixon v. Lovef 431 U.S. 105

(1977)f the court noted that the property interest was a substantial one because a state could not make a driver whole for any
personal inconvenience and economic hardship suffered by reason
of an erroneous suspension.

However, the court also pointed out

that the actual weight given to a private interest depended upon
weighing three factors:

1) the duration of the revocation; 2)

the availability of hardship relief; and 3) the availability of
post-revocation review.

The court concluded that the ninety day

suspension combined with the availability of immediate postrevocation review outweighed any constitutional deficiency which
was implicated by the absence of any hardship relief in the
Massachusetts statute.
In considering the second prong of the Mathews v.
Eldridge test, the court reviewed the likelihood of an erroneous
deprivation and emphasized that the Due Process Clause does not
mandate error-free governmental decisions:
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Thus, even though our legal tradition
regards the adversary process as the
best means of ascertaining truth and
minimizing the risk of error, the
"ordinary principle" established by
our prior decisions is that "something
less than an evidentiary hearing is
sufficient prior to adverse administrative action." Dixon v. Love, supra,
(431 U.S.) at 113 (97 S.Ct. at 1728).
And, when prompt postdeprivation review
is available for correction of administrative error, we have generally required no more than that predeprivation
procedures used be desinged to provide
a reasonably reliable basis for concluding
that the facts justifying the official
action are as a responaible governmental
official warrants them to be.
Id. at J.3.
Thus, the Court was satisfied that the Massachusetts procedure
provided enough due process because it provided a "reasonably
reliable basis" for concluding whether a driver had refused to
submit to a chemical test.

Significantly, the Court was

satisfied that the risk of erroneous deprivation seemed minimal
where the determination of whether there was a refusal depended
upon "objective facts." 443 U.S. at 13.

Additionally, the Court

felt that any administrative error could be cured by a prompt
post deprivation evidentiary hearing.
The third factor analyzed in Montrym was the public
interest.

The Montrym court concluded that keeping the roads

safe and free of drunk drivers together with avoiding fiscal and
administrative burdens outweighed the private interest and the
risk of erroneous deprivation.

D.

UTAH STATUTES FAIL TO PROVIDE THE MINIMUM SAFEGUARDS
MANDATED BY MONTRYM AND DUE PROCESS
Comparing Montrym to the facts and statutes

implicated

in the case at bar compels the conclusion that Utah Code
- 15 -

Annotated Section 41-2-19.6 and Section 41-2-20 deprive Utah
Drivers of their licenses without due process of law.

By sub-

jecting the Utah statutory scheme to a Mathews v. Eldridge analysis f two defects emerge.

First, the postdeprivation review,

although prompt, is constitutionally inadequate.
risk of erroneous deprivation is substantial.

Second, the

These factors com-

bine under the Utah statutory scheme in such a fashion that a
driver never receives a meaningful hearing in a due process sense
either before or after the deprivation of his license.
In Montrym, the Court was impressed by the availability
of prompt postdeprivation review.

Under the Massachusetts sta-

tute, a driver is afforded two tiers of administrative review as
well as a judicial review.

443 U.S. at 6, Footnote 4.

The

Montrym court emphasized that the availability of a prompt postdeprivation evidentiary hearing was critical to upholding the
Massachusetts statute:
Thus, even though our legal tradition
regards the adversay process as the best
means of ascertaining truth and minimizing
the risk of error, the "ordinary principle"
established by our prior decisions is that
"something less than an evidentiary hearing
is sufficient prior to adverse administrative
action. 443 U.S. at 13.
Emphasis supplied.
In contrast, under the Utah statutes, the appellant had
one administrative evidentiary hearing followed by a judicial
review limited to an arbitrary and capricious standard of review.
In the context of reviewing a Section 41-2-19.6 hearing,
an arbitrary and capricious review of the record is tantamount to
no review at all.

In Utah Department of Administrative Services
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v. Public Services Commission, 658 P.2d|601 (Utah 1983), the
court makes it clear that fact finding from an administrative
hearing will not be reversed unless the record is bereft of any
evidence to support the finding.
Thus, in reviewing decisions on unemployment compensation. . . we have declared
that we will sustain the finding of the
Industrial Commission if "there is
evidence of any substance whatever which
can reasonably be regarded as supporting
the determination made. . . "
Id. at £09
Because a Section 41-2-19.6 hearing will always include the
arresting officer's testimony, and because that testimony will
realistically always include the officer's testimony that he
detected the odor of an alcoholic beverage, the hearing officer's
determination will always be supported by some evidence.
In a similar context, the California Supreme Court
mandated in Berlinghieri v. Director of Motor Vehicles, 657 P.2d
383 (Calif. 1983), that the judicial review of administrative
decisions suspending a driver's license under California's
implied consent law requires application of the independent
judgment standard rather than the substantial evidence standard.
In reaching this conclusion, the California court stressed that
the retention of a driver's license was such an important right
to citizens in our travel-oriented society that the stricter
standard of review was constitutionally required.

The substan-

tial evidence test in Berlinghieri is the equivalent of the
arbitrary and capricious standard of review in Section 41-2-20.
This standard is constitutionally inadequate to buttress the sum-
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mary nature of a Section 41-2-19.6 hearing.

These statutes

offend due process as that phrase has been construed by the Utah
Supreme Court.

Our high court has observed that "the essential

requirement of due process is that every citizen be afforded his
'day in court'.

It has always been the policy of our law to

resolve doubts in favor of permitting parties to have their day
in court on the merits of a controversy."

Celebrity Club, Inc.

v. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 657 P.2d 1293 1296 (Utah 1979).
Sections 41-2-19.6 and 41-2-20 prevent a Utah driver from ever
receiving a hearing on the merits.
In other United States Supreme Court decisions, due process has been satisfied because of the adequacy of postdeprivation review.

In Mathews v. Eldridge, supra,

disability-benefit termination procedures were upheld where the
recipient was afforded an opportunity to make extensive written
submissions to the decision-maker before the initial termination
decision was made.

Additionally, the recipient was entitled to a

full evidentiary hearing after termination of benefits.

In Dixon

v. Love, supra, the challenged statute permitted summary revocation of a driver's license based on the strength of a cummulative
record of traffic convictions.

In upholding the statute, the

court stressed that a driver "had the opportunity for a full
judicial hearing in connection with each of the traffic decisions
on which the . . . decision was based."

431 U.S. at 113.

The other factor which the Montrym court stressed, and
which distinguishes the case at bar, is that the risk of
erroneous deprivation is certainly not minimal under the Utah
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statutory scheme.

The Montrym court emphasized, when considering

the second prong of the Mathews v, Eldridge test, that the combination of prompt postrevocation review plus the "reasonably
reliable basis" of ascertaining objective facts in the context of
a refusal to submit to a chemical test Conferred sufficient due
process upon a driver to save the Massachusetts scheme from
constitutional infirmity.
In sharp contrast, the Utah statutory scheme fails in
both regards.

As already discussed, the post-deprivation review

is inadequate and the initial Section 4|.-2-19.6 hearing does not
provide a "reasonable reliable basis" for ascertaining objective
facts.

Unlike Montrym, where the hearing officer's inquiry is

limited to a simple resolution of whether a driver refused to
submit to a chemical testf the Utah hearing officer must inquire
into the realm of contested and subjective facts.

Utah Code

Annotated Section 41-2-19.6 requires the hearing officer to
ascertain 1) whether he had probable ca^ise to believe the driver
was under the influence and 2) whether the blood alcohol result
of .08% or more was accurate.

Notwithstanding Montrym, the

Supreme Court has never held a police officer's version of a
disputed encounter between the police and a private citizen is
inevitably accurate and reliable.

Because the officer is

involved in the competitive enterprise <^f ferreting out crime,
his perceptions are not necessarily unbiased.

However, in the

instant action, the trooper's subjective opinion about the
appellant's performance on the field agility tests was accepted
by the hearing officer, and the appellant's own opinion was
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rejected.

Additionally, although the determination of whether a

particular blood alcohol test result is accurate may be ascertainable from "objective facts," the record in the instant matter
discloses that that incompetent evidence was received to reach
that determination.

Moreover, even in the absence of the intoxi-

lyzer test result, the facts in evidence do not support a conclusion that the respondent established that the appellant was under
the influence by a preponderance of the evidence.
The scope of the inquiry at the Section 41-2-19.6
hearing clearly exceeds the scop€> of the Montrym inquiry.

It

also exceeds the scope of the hearing discussed in Dixon v. Love,
supra.

There the focus of the hearing centered simply on

reviewing routinely maintained records of traffic convictions.
Clearly there is a significant difference between ascertaining
objective facts, such as adjudicated convictions in Dixon, and
refusals in Montrym, and subjective facts under Section
41-2-19.6, such as a driver's performance on field sobriety
tests, a driver's driving pattern, or the accuracy of a blood
alcohol test result.
The appellant submits that a driver is constitutionally
entitled to a trial de novo review in the district court under
the challenged statutory scheme.

Only if the driver receives a

full evidentiary judicial review can it be said that he has
received a constitutionally "meaningful11 hearing.

In the absence

of a trial de novo in the district court, appellant submits she
was denied due process of law.
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E.

THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW
BECAUSE THE SAME EMPLOYEE OF RESPONDENT
ACTED BOTH AS PROSECUTOR AND JUDGE

At appellant's administrative hearing, Dennis Hicks, an
employee of the Driver's License Division, presided as the hearing
officer.

At said hearing, Mr. Hicks asked appellant numerous

questions.

Appellant submits that Mr. Hicks was not an impartial

decisionmaker since he also acted as prosecutor eliciting evidence and presenting the respondent's case against the appellant.
In Vali Convalescent & Care Institution v. Industrial
Commissionf 649 P.2d 33 (Ut. 1982 ) f this court observed that the
practice of an agency acting both as prosecutor and judge at an
administrative hearing was not unconstitutional if those distinct
functions were kept separate within the agency.

Appellant sub-

mits that Vali mandates that if an agency is going to perform
both a prosecutorial and a judicial function, then a different
person employed by that agency must perform those distinct functions.

The same person cannot serve both roles and retain his

impartiality as the judicial decisionmaker.
In Paoli v. Cottonwood Hospital, 656 P.2d 420 (Ut. 1982) f
this Court observed that the Second Injury Fund must be treated
as a separate entity from the Industrial Commission notwithstanding the fact that the Industrial Commission directs the
Institution of the Second Injury Fund.
. . . the Second Injury Fund n^eds to
have independent administrative direction
within the Industrial Commission from some
official not responsible for the adjudicative functions of the commission that
"direct its distribution."
Id. at 422.
The administrative hearing officer employed by the
respondent who conducted the § 41-2-19.6 hearing in this case
- 21 -

does not have the necessary separation of judicial and prosecutorial functions.

Because the judge and prosecutor are one and

the same individual, in administrative § 41-2-19.6 hearings,
independent judicial decisions are not made after the adversial
system has had an opportunity to present competent evidence.
Due process requires a fair trial in a fair tribunal.
In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955).

The appellant did not

receive a fair trial at her § 41-2-19.6 hearing because the tribunal was not impartial.

POINT VI
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 41-2-19.6
AND 41-2-20 DENY UTAH DRIVERS WHO SUBMIT
TO CHEMICAL TESTS EQUAL PROTECTION OF
THE LAW
If a Utah driver submits to a chemical test and the test
result exceeds .08%, his license is subject to suspension under
U.C.A. Sections 41-2-19.6 and 41-2-20.

In contrast, if a Utah

driver refuses to cooperate and refuses to submit to a chemical
test, his license is subject to suspension under U.C.A. Section
41-6-44.10(2).

However, the suspension under the implied consent

law takes place only after the department has notified the driver
of a "refusal" hearing.

The arresting officer is subpeonaed by

the Department and appears in person at the hearing.

His sworn

testimony is subject to cross-examination by the driver.

This

decision of the administrative hearing can be appealed to the
district court where the court "is vested with jurisdiction, and
it shall set the matter for trial de novo upon 10 days written
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notice to the department and thereupon take testimony and examine
into the facts of the case and determine whether the petitioner's
license is subject to revocation under the provisions of this
act." Thus, the uncooperative driver receives a full evidentiary
hearing at the judicial level.

Additionally, because of the de

novo nature of the refusal hearing under the implied consent law,
the driver who refuses to submit to a chemical test also receives
the reinstatement of his license pending the outcome of his
appeal in the district court or the Supreme Court, Cullimore v.
Schwendiman, 652 P.2d 915 (Ut. 1982).

In contrast, Sections

41-2-19.6 and 41-2-20 do not provide for the reinstatement of the
driver's license during the pendency of the judicial review.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution does not deny to States the
power to treat different classes of persons in different ways.
However, it does deny to States the power to legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into
different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to a
legitimate objective of the statute:
A classification 'must be reasonable,
not arbitrary, and must rest upon some
ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of
the legislation, so that all persons
similarly circumstanced si^all be treated
alike. ' Royster Guano Co.| v. Virginia,
253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972),.
The question therefore becomes whether there is some
ground of difference that rationally explains the different
treatment of drivers who submit to a chemical test and drivers
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who refuse to submit to a chemical test.

The plaintiff submits

that the State's different treatment of the two categories of
drivers does not bear any reasonable or rational relationship to
the State's legitimate interest in removing drunken drivers from
the Utah highways.
In Montrym, the court was persuaded that by affording a
driver a presuspension hearing, public safety would be undermined
because the drunk driver would receive an incentive to refuse to
take a chemical test and demand a presuspension hearing as a
dilatory tactic.

However, in the case at bar, both the driver

who refuses and the driver who submits receive a presuspension
hearing.

The only difference is that the driver who refuses

receives significantly more due process than the driver who
cooperates and submits to the test.

The legitimate state

interest in offering incentives to take a test which can provide
relaible evidence of intoxication is clearly not served by
rewarding the driver who refuses to take the test.

Because the

different treatment of the two classes of Utah drivers in no way
rationally furthers the State's interest in convicting and
keeping impaired drivers off the highways of Utah, the challenged
statutes violate the Equal Protection Clause.

CONCLUSION

Appellant seeks a reversal of th€* judgment suspending
her driving privileges for ninetydays.

Appellant alsoseeks a

determination by this court that U.C.A. § 41-2-19.6 and § 41-2-20
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deny Otah drivers both the due process of the law and the
equal protection of the law.
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"APPENDIX 1"

cncersigr.ec, beir.g TZ$\ c . y swcm, state mat:
Breath testing instrument, INTOXE.YZER,.serial [number 27— /C2
4*^0
located at Sfl S/SPT/rfrft ^Z) was properly checked by Be/us to the
of official duties, en 25~j!2sj!r
»d^jat
WSe
Pu.
2.

This was dop« »fr-r>rriinp tn th> »tapdaxds established by the Commissioner of
the Utah Department of Public Safety.
This is the official record and notes of this procedure which were made at the
time these tests were done.

3.

THE FOLLOWING TESTS WERE MADE:
^y"
(*ytlectrical power check: (Power switch on, power indicator light is on)

YES

N0

(z*-^

t \

(^"Temperature check (Ready light is on)
[A^
(/flnternal purge check: (Air pump works, runs for approximately 35 seconds) (^""
W Z e r o set. Error indicator, and Printer check:
(Zero set at .000. .001. .002, .003.)
(•With proper zero set, printer works properly)
(Error light comes on when operated with wrong ziro set)
(Printer deactivated when error light is on)
in
j?{ ) Fixed absorbtion calibrator test (if equipped)
fi/*7m£j?4//ff/t0
(Reads within • .011 of calibration setting)
'
(r
W c h e c k e d with known sample: (Simulator, 3 tests within + .01%)
if^
W a i v e s readings in percent blood alcohol by weight, based upon grams of
alcohol per 100 cubic centimeters of blood.

( )
( )

(*r, ( )

REPAIRS REQUIRED

A/**/**

(If yes, explain)
The simulator solution was of the correct kind and properly |compounded.
(*f*The results of this test show that the instrument is working properly.
Last prior check of this instrument was done on

/<?

jfe^^

)

COUNTY OF

)

AAH \ s. k* -

%£

(T

()

19L^£-

I /we. on oath, state tha^ the foregoing is true u

—•

cJ2z&L

Si^l>e?iibedr^rui sWofn before me this
J/LYiArfM'W'-fiMrfirLfi.fl
^tf»
Notary >ublic<V /
My comnussiOA -expires
lU A , ^i

T

35-

day of

^T^i^,

City of residence - k u ^ u
County of resipence_

C)
f^r"

~TP/?

^.••"-*>.,.,

()

()

BREATH TEST TECHNICIAN(S)

STATE OF UTAH

()

"APPENDIX 2"

Section 41-6-44.3 provides as follows:
(1)

The commissioner of public safety shall
establish standards for the administration
and interpretation of chemical analysis of
a person's breath including standards of
training.

(2)

In any action or proceeding in which it is
material to prove that a person was driving
or in actual physical control of a vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol or
driving with a blood alcohol content of
,10% or greater, documents offered as
memoranda or records of acts, conditions
or events to prove that the analysis and
accuracy of the instrument were made pursuant to standards established in subsection (1) shall be admissible if:

(3)

(a)

The judge finds that they were made
in the regular course of the investigation at or about the time of the
act, condition or event; and

(b)

The source of information from
which made and the method and circumstances of their preparation were
such as to indicate their trustworthiness.

If the judge finds that the standards
established under subsection (1) and
the provisions of subsection (2) have
been met, there shall be a presumption
that the test results are valid and
further foundation for introduction of
the evidence is unnecessary.

"APPENDIX 3"

Revised: April 1 , 19£i
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I . TECHNIQUES OR METHODS

A.

Tests to determine the concentration of alcohol in a persons blood,
may be applied to blood, breath or other bodily substances.

Results

shall be expressed as equivalent to grams of alcohol per one hundred
(100) cubic centimeters of blood.

The results of such tests shall be

entered in a permanent record book.

B.

Written check lists, outlining the method of properly performing
the tests in use under division A

of this regulation, shall be

available at each location where tests are given.

The check list and

the test record shall be retained by the operator administering the
test or the arresting officer.

Definition :

A check list sets forth the steps, in sequence, that a breath
test operator must follow.

A square is provided by each of the

steps for the operator to check each one as| it is performed to
insure proper operation of the test instrument.

!!•

BREATH TESTS

A.

Breath samples of alveolar air shall be analyzed with instruments
specifically designed for the analysis of breath.

The calculation

of the blood alcohol concentration shall be on the basis of aveolar
air to blood ratio of 2100:1.

Breath samples shall be analyzed

according to the methods described by the Manufacturer of the
instrument or instructions issued by the office of the Commissioner
of Public Safety.

TESTS FOR CHECKING CALIBRATION

A.

Breath testing instruments must be certified on a routine basis
not to exceed forty (40) days.

B.

Calibration tests must be performed by a technician using appropriate solutions of ethyl alcohol, and using methods and techniques for
checking calibration recommended by the manufacturer of the
instrument or the office o' the Commissioner of Public Safety.

C.

Results of test for calibration shall be kept in a permanent record
book.

A report of each calibration test shall be recorded on the

appropriate form and sent to the supervisor of the Breath Testing
Program.

The supervisor of the Breath Testing Program is heresy

designated as the official keeper of said records.

PROCEDURE FOR C E R T I F I C A T I O N OF INSTRUMENTS

A.

Breathalyzer

1.

Instrument heating properly:
a.

2.

3.

between 47 and 53 degrees centigrade

Collection chamber output:
a.

COLD between 55 and 58 cc's

b.

WARM between 50 and 54 ccvs

NULL meter functioning properly:
a.

Must be able to achieve a balance and swing freely in both
directions.

4.

READ LIGHT IN MECHANICAL CENTE^:
Place two ampoules of the same control number in the holders,
t u r n on the read light, balance galvanometer and check for
mechanical c e n t e r .
light.

Switch the ampoules, turn on the read

The null meter should not swing more than J inch in

either direction.
5.

BLOOD ALCOHOL POINTER SLIPPAGE CHECK:
Balance the instrument with ampoules iti the h o l d e r s .

Set

the blood alcohol pointer on .20%, or cdnter of t h e EIGGG
Alcohol scale.

Using the light c a r n a g e ! adjustment, ar.d with

the read light on. run the B. A. needlei to .00% and back to
. 2J%, observing to see that the null meter balances a: the
same time the B . A. needle reaches .20%. Then r u n the B. A.
needle to .40% and back to .20% observing to see that the null
meter balances at the .20% line on the b}ood alcohol scale.
6.

SIMULATOR CHECK:
At least t h r e e (3) simulator checks of a known value shall be
run on the i n s t r u m e n t .

The r e s u l t s must be within .01 plus

or minus of the actual value of the knowft solution.
7.

AMPOULE CHECK:
A series of simulator t e s t s with the accumulated total of .60%
shall be run on an ampoule from each control number on hand
with the i n s t r u m e n t .

The r e s u l t s of each simulator test must

be within .01 plus or minus of the actual value.

T h e ampoule

should then be observed to see if t h e r e i$ a slight yellow color,
indicating t h e presence of potasium dichi^omate.

If it meets the

above s t a n d a r d s , the chemicals are correct or within allowed
tolerances.

B.

Intcxilyzer

1.

E L E C T R I C A L POWER C H E C K :

With the power s w i t c h o n ,

o b s e r v e to see that the power indicator light comes o n ,
i n d i c a t i n g t h e r e is electrical power to the i n s t r u m e n t .

2.

T E M P E R A T U R E CHECK

If the instrument is a l r e a d y

warmed u p , check to see that the ready Iignt is o n .
If it is not warmed u p , wait approximately
to see that the ready light comes o n .

10 m i r . j t e s

( T h i s light

indicates that the sample chamber is heated to t h e
proper temperature).

3.

I N T E R N A L PURCE CHECK:
t h e air b l a n k mode.

Put the mode s e l e c t o - in

Place thumb on the end of t h e pump

t u b e to see t h a t it is pumping a i r .

Time the p u m r i n g

sequence to see that it pumps for a p p r o x i m a t e l y

35

seconds.

t*.

ZERO SET A N D ERROR I N D I C A T O R

CHECK

( A s Mode!)

Set the mode selector in the zero set mode.

D e p r e s s the

zero adjust k n o b and adjust the d i g i t a l display to a plus
. 0 0 0 , . 0 0 1 , .002 or .003 to see that you can a c h i e v e a p r o p e r
zero set.

R e - s e t the digital display above the a c c e p t a b l e plus

. 0 0 0 to . 0 0 3 .

Place the mode selector to the test n o d e and

o b s e r v e to see that the e r r o r light comes o n .

Repeat,

placing

t h e d i g i t a l display at minus .000 and o b s e r v e to see that the
e r r o r light comes on when t h e mode selector is p l a c e d i^ the
test mode.

(ASA Model)
Advance the test cycle to the zero set mode and see that
the unit r e g i s t e r s a reading of plus .000, .001, .002, or
.003.

If this reading is not o b s e r v e d , advance to the next

cycle and see that the error light comep or:
FIXED ABSORBTION CALIBRATOR CHlECK:

With the test

card in the p r i n t e r , r u n a test on the f i x e - absorbtion
calibrator to see that the instrument gives the correct
reading on the digital display and the p r i n t e d test c a r d .
THIS CHECK NOT REQUIRED ON INSTRUMENTS NOT
EQUIPPED WITH THE FIXED A B S O E B T J O N CALIBRATOR.
SIMULATOR CHECK:

Run t h r e e tests 6n a simulator

solution of a known value and an air blank before each
one.

O b s e r v e to see t h a t the correct r e a d i n g s , within

plus or minus . 01 of t h e actual value is indicated on the
digital display and p r i n t e d on t h e test q a r c fcr each simulator test and a .00

reading for each a i r l b l a n k .

PRINTER DEACTIVATOR CHECK:

(AS (Model) Run a

simulator t e s t with t h e zero set NOT in i h e proper zero
set r a n g e , to see that the p r i n t e r is deactivated and will
not p r i n t .
(ASA Model)
This check must be performed before t h i unit is to
operating t e m p e r a t u r e ,

(before the r e a a y lamp is on)

Advance the unit to t h e first p u r g e cycle {air b l a n k ) .
Observe the e r r o r light to see that it is j i t .

A: the end

of the test cycle (approximately 35 seconds) , see that the
pump stops and that the p r i n t e r is deactivated and will
not p r i n t .

V.

QUALIFICATIONS OF PERSONNEL

A.

B r e a t h test shall be performed by a qualified operator who shall
have completed the operators course prescribed by the Commissioner
of Public Safety.

Operators shall use only those instruments

which they are certified to operate.

B.

Breath test operator certification requirements:

1.

Must have successfully completed training for each type of
instrument and pass the required test, as approved b* the
Commissioner of Public Safety.

2.

Operators must complete an approved recertificatron training
course and pass a test every two (2) years to maintain their
certification.

C.

Breath test technician requirements:

1.

Must comply with one of the following:
a.

Must successfully complete the Breath Testing Supervisors
course offered by Indiana State University.

b.

A manufacturers repair technician course for the breath
testing instruments in use in the State of U t a h .

c.

Be qualified by the nature of his employment or training
to maintain and repair the breath testing instrument in
question and to instruct in the proper operation of the
instrument.

VI.

REVOCATION OF CERTIFICATION

A.

T h e Commissioner of Public Safety may on the recommendation of
a technician, revoke the certification of any operator:

1.

Who obtains a certification card falsely or deceitfully.

2.

Who fails to comply with the foregoinb provisions governing
the operation of breath test instruments.

3.

Who fails to demonstrate satisfactory (performance in
operating breath testing instruments,

VII.

PREVIOUSLY QUALIFIED PERSONNEL

The foregoing regulations shall not be construed as invalidating the
qualification of personnel previously qualified! as either breath test
operators or breath test technicians under programs existing prior
to the promulgation of these regulations.

Such personnel shall be

deemed certified until such time as retraining |would have been required were these regulations not in effect.

This provision shall take effect as if enacted Contemporaneously with
the other Breath Testing Regulations of the D ppartment of Public
Safety on June 11, 1979.

In the opinion of the Department of Public Saffcty, it is necessary to
the peace, health and welfare of the inhabitants of the State of Utah
that this regulation become effective immediately.

A.

Training for original certification is to be conducted by a Breath
Test Technician and should include the following:

1 h o u r . . .Welcome, registration, preview of Alcohol and Traffic Safety.
3 hours. .Effects of Alcohol in the Human Body.
3 hours. .Operational Principles of Breath Testing.
2 hours. .Alcoholic Influence Report Form.
2 hours. .Testimony of the Arresting Officer.
3 hours..Legal Aspects of Chemical Testing.
1 h o u r . . .Detecting the Drinking Driver.
8 hours. .Laboratory Participation.

(Running Simulator tests on the

instruments and tests on actual drinking subjects).
1 h o u r . . .Examination and Critiques of Course.

B.

Training for recertification is to be conducted by a Breath Testing
Technician and should include the following:

2 hours. .Effects of alcohol in the Human Body.
2 hours. .Operational principles of Breath Testing.
1 h o u r . . .Alcohol Influence Report Form and Testimony of arresting officer.
2 hours..Legal Aspects of Chemical Testing and Detecting and the
Drinking D r i v e r .
1 h o u r . . .Exam.

C.

Anyone having previously successfully completed a twenty-four (2a)
hour operators school, may be recertified at anytime by successfully
completing an eight (8) hour recertification course, and also may be
certified to operate another t y p e of breath testing instrument after
eight (8) hours instruction pertaining to the instrument in question.
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CERTIFICATE
I , t h e u n d e r s i g n e d , being f i rCUSTODIAN'S
s t duly sworn,
state that:
1-

I am the B r e a m Testing Supervisor of the Utah highway Patrol end t*e

keener of and responsible f o r the maintenance check records of the breath
,r. , . r ,
2-

ronr s maint

-".tached are

official
testing

2 inec in the State of Utah.
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: r
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recusations of t h e Cc^rissioner of Public Safety.
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r

r

a , -eauired by the De;a tment of Public
i.

h

:.

Safety:

ave success?-", l y completed the Breath Testjng Supervisors course at

University,

requiremen

Indiana

or

a manufacturer's r e p a i r t e c h n i c i a n course fcjr breath t e s f g

instruments in

use i n the State of Utah, or
is q u a l i f i e d by nature of his employment or t r a i n i n g to m a i n t a i - and
the b r e a t h t e s t i n g instrument i n question an|id t o i n s t r u c t
of the instrument.
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